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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying

Mrs. Coelho's motion to continue alimony in the amount of $1,000
per month and awarding her only $1.00 per year alimony.
2.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by awarding

Mr. Coelho reimbursement from Mrs. Coelho's share of the home sale
proceeds for mortgage payments made by him pending the sale.
The

trial

court's

decision

as

to these

accorded considerable discretion by this court.

issues

is

to be

However, although

the court's actions are entitled to a presumption of validity, this
court cannot affirm those actions where there has been an abuse of
discretion.
discretion

It is an error of
for

the

court

to

law constituting

fail

to

support

an abuse of

its decision

by

specific and detailed findings and the findings are themselves
subject to the clearly erroneous standard of review.

(See Hall v.

Hall, 858 P.2d 1018 (Utah App. 1993) and Howell v. Howell, 806 P.2d
1209 (Utah App. 1991).)

IV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH
00O00

MARY COELHO,
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Plaintiff/Appellant,
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Case No. 940666-CA

:

Priority No. 15

:
:

District Court 11093

ALCIDES J. COELHO,
Defendant/Appellee,
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO REVIEW THE ALIMONY AWARD
PURSUANT TO THE DECREE OF DIVORCE ENTERED IN
THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH,
THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, PRESIDING

APPELLANT" S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction
provisions of

of

this

Court

is conferred

pursuant

Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(i) (1994).

to

the

This action

involves the appeal of certain provisions of the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Order on Plaintiff's Motion to Review the
Alimony Award Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce signed and entered
in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Summit County,
State of Utah on October 4, 1994.
filed on November 1, 1994.

A timely Notice of Appeal was

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
There are no specific statutes or cases which are identifiable
as determinative authority.

Instead, see cases cited in the Tables

of Cases.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is the second appeal in this case.

After the first

trial, Mrs. Coelho appealed, among other things, the lower court's
decision awarding her alimony in the amount of only $1,000 per
month for a period of one year, with a review to determine whether
alimony should continue beyond that period.

This Court affirmed

the lower Court's ruling in a Memorandum Decision entered on or
about June 7, 1994.
Alimony

Award

Mrs. Coelho filed her Motion to Review the

pursuant

to the Decree

of Divorce

on

or

about

February 9, 1994, and the matter was heard before the Honorable
David S. Young on May 10, 1994.

The court denied the motion,

refused to continue alimony at $1,000 per month and awarded alimony
in the amount of $1.00 per year.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The plaintiff/appellant, Mrs. Mary Coelho (hereinafter Mrs.
Coelho), and defendant/respondent, Alcides J. Coelho (hereinafter
Mr. Coelho), were married on July 16, 1977. (R.2)

Three children

were born as issue of this marriage, Sara, now 16 years of age,
born August 7, 1978; Tony, now 14 years of age, born August 19,
1980; and Emily, now 8 years of age, born September 29, 1986. (R.

2

2, 13)

At the first trial, the parties stipulated that the two

youngest children would remain in Mrs. Coelho's custody, and that
the oldest child would remain in the custody of Mr. Coelho, subject
to liberal visitation for each of them with the child or children
not in their physical custody. (R. 333)
The parties' middle child, Tony, is handicapped and has been
diagnosed with Attention Deficit Disorder

(ADD) and has started

hearing voices and having problems at school.

(R. 631)

Tony

requires substantial personal time, attention and care from Mrs.
Coelho, who is concerned that now, because of his physical size,
Tony could mistreat or harm his younger sister, or set the house on
fire in her absence.

(R. 632)

After the parties married, Mrs. Coelho did not complete her
college education but held various jobs, in addition to being a
full-time homemaker and mother.

(R. 466)

She worked as a real

estate agent during the 1980's, (R. 467) as a ski repairer, as a
ski instructor, and as a bookkeeper for Mr. Coelho's business. (R.
466)
At the time of the second trial, Mrs. Coelho was a full-time
pre-nursing student at the University of Utah (R. 634) , and also
worked as a full-time ski instructor, which was only seasonal, and
as a trainer in a center for handicapped adults, which was a parttime position. (R. 626)

Mrs. Coelho's earnings from the Park City

Ski Corporation for 1993 were $4,841.61 (R. 615) and her earnings
from Chrysalis Enterprises for 1993 were $1,717.56. (R. 617)
3

In

addition, Mrs. Coelho briefly worked for Select Home Care and her
1993 W-2 earnings from that job were $133.90.

(R. 616).

combined total earnings for 1993 were $6,693.07.

(R. 621)

Her

Mrs. Coelho testified that her minimum monthly expenses, for
herself and two children are $2,3 61.00, and that her standard of
living has deteriorated substantially since the parties have been
divorced. (R. 638-643)
Mrs. Coelho testified at the second trial that, due to Tony's
handicap and his increasing need for supervision, she could not
work nights and weekends as she would be required to do if she
returned to the real estate business. (R. 633) She also testified
that she did not have an appropriate vehicle to use, and that her
real estate license had expired in 1992. (R. 630-31, 662)
At the time of the first trial, the lower court found that Mr.
Coelho's earnings were $5,000 per month.

At the second trial, Mr.

Coelho was still self-employed and submitted his 1993 income tax
return, which reflected as gross income of $48,226, and an adjusted
gross income of $27,385. (See Exhibit 14-D) Mr. Coelho's claimed
business expenses, as shown on his 1993 return, include deductions
for health insurance, the use of his personal residence as an
office,

telephone

charges,

legal

and

accounting

fees,

and

entertainment.
At

the second

trial, Plaintiff

offered evidence

that Mr.

Coelho had taken personal draws from his business in the amount of
$48,104.93 during 11 months of 1993, or $4,373.18 per month.
4

(Ex.

8-P)

Mr. Coelho testified that much of this amount was a loan as

he was only entitled to one-third of the draws he had taken during
the year, and that the remaining amounts allegedly belonged to his
two partners in the business. (R. 704)

There was no evidence other

than his testimony to support this position.
The trial court expressed its opinion that both parties had
made voluntary choices which reduced their present ability to earn
amounts consistent with what they had historically earned.

The

court went on to find that Mr. Coelho's gross monthly income is
$3,000 and that Mrs. Coelho made a voluntary choice to attend
school rather than re-enter the work force as a real estate agent.
(R. 747,750)

The court made no specific finding as to her monthly

income.
After presentation of the evidence, the trial court made
its ruling from the bench:
1.

Denying Mrs. Coelho's Motion to continue the alimony of

$1,000 per month without prejudice, and awarding her alimony in the
amount of $1.00 per year commencing February 1994;
2.

Terminating Mrs. Coelho's alimony award of $1,000 per

month as of January 1, 1994;
Based on its conclusion that Mrs. Coelho had insufficient

3.

funds to do so, the trial court entered its order requiring Mr.
Coelho

to

keep

the

mortgage

payments

current

on

the

marital

residence in which Mrs. Coelho and two of the parties' children
reside until the house is sold.

Upon sale of the house, the court

5

ordered that Mr. Coelho be reimbursed for such payments from Mrs.
Coelho's share of the equity.

(R. 607)

Mrs. Coelho filed her Notice of Appeal on November 1, 1994.
(R. 797)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
1.

The trial court abused its discretion by awarding Mrs.

Coelho the grossly inadequate alimony amount of $1.00 per year.

It

was clear from the testimony at the hearing on Plaintiff's Motion
that she simply had insufficient funds, even without the payment of
the monthly mortgage, to meet her needs.

Despite the overwhelming

evidence to the contrary, the trial court did not award her any
additional alimony to supplement her income.
2.

The trial court abused its discretion by ordering that

Mr. Coelho be reimbursed from Mrs. Coelho's share of the equity in
their home for mortgage payments the court ordered him to pay until
the home was sold.

The trial court's order, in light of its

acknowledgment that Mrs. Coelho had insufficient funds to pay the
mortgage

is inherently inconsistent with its order

alimony of $1,000 per month.

terminating

Further, it will result

in the

depletion of Mrs. Coelho's share of the only marital asset having
any significant value.

It is simply inequitable to require her to

deplete this asset to meet her monthly living expenses when Mr.
Coelho has the ability to pay alimony for this purpose.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY DENYING MRS.
COELHO'S MOTION TO CONTINUE ALIMONY AT $1,000 PER MONTH
AND BY AWARDING HER ALIMONY IN THE GROSSLY INADEQUATE
AMOUNT OF ONLY $1 PER YEAR
The factors a court must consider when making an award of
alimony are well-settled in Utah law.

In awarding alimony, a court

is required to consider:
1.

The financial condition and needs of the
party seeking alimony;

2.

That party's ability to produce sufficient
income for him or herself; and

3.

The ability of the other party to provide support.

See Munns v. Munns, 790 P.2d 116, 121 (Utah App. 1990); Naranio v.
Naranio, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah App. 1988); Watson v. Watson,
837 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1992).
This court has also held that the " [f]ailure to analyze the
parties'

circumstances

in

the

light

constitutes an abuse of discretion."

of

these

three

factors

Naranio v. Naranio, 751 P.2d

at 1147 (Utah App. 1988).
Applying

these

factors to the case on appeal, the

court

clearly abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Coelho's motion to
continue the alimony awarded to her in the Decree of Divorce and
instead, awarding her alimony of only $1.00 per year.
second

trial,

Mrs.

Coelho

testified

that

her

At the

monthly

expenses are $2,3 61.00, and this testimony was undisputed.

living
Even

so, the court completely failed to address the first factor and
failed to make any findings whatsoever as to Mrs. Coelho's monthly
7

needs.

This is critical to a determination of whether Mrs. Coelho

has the ability to meet her needs without any alimony from Mr.
Coelho.

It

is

curious,

however,

that

the

trial

court

did

acknowledge, in Finding No. 4, that Mrs. Coelho was responsible for
the mortgage payments in the amount of $1,320 under the terms of
the original Decree of Divorce, "but has insufficient money with
which

to

do

this."

(R.

788)

This

constitutes an abuse of discretion.

inherent

inconsistency

The absence of a finding in

this regard negates the need to marshall evidence in its support.
However, the record in this case suggests that the court concluded
that a consideration of Mrs. Coelho7s needs was not relevant in
light

of

her

voluntary

decision

to

continue

education instead of re-entering the work force.

her

pre-nursing

This, likewise,

is an abuse of discretion.
The second factor a court must consider in awarding alimony is
the ability of a receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income
for herself.

As in the first trial, the lower court once again

found that Mrs. Coelho had demonstrated the historical ability to
generate sufficient income for herself as a real estate agent.
After the second trial, the trial court simply restated its
first findings in this regard:
The court finds that [Mrs. Coelho] is currently
working at employment as a [ski] instructor and
working with disabled children, earning an income
substantially below what she has historically
earned when she was active as a real estate sales
person during the 1985, 1986, 1987 and 1988 years,
as reflected in plaintiff's own Exhibit 11. It is
anticipated that [Mrs. Coelho] should be able to
8

become more gainfully employed and after a short
period of time earn an income sufficient to meet
her own needs based upon her demonstrated ability.
(Finding No. 8; R.34 0 and Finding No. 1; R. 787, emphasis added)
There is no dispute that Mrs. Coelho earned the amounts set
forth in Exhibit 13 during the years listed.

However, it is also

undisputed that she had derived no income from selling real estate
for more than five years before the first trial and that her
license had expired in 1992.

As Mrs. Coelho argued in the first

appeal, the court erred in this conclusion
time which had lapsed.

given the period of

At the second trial, over two years later,

the court compounded this error by continuing to speculate that she
could and should "maximize her earnings" by once again selling real
estate.

At this point, she has not derived income from selling

real estate for almost seven years.
Mrs. Coelho's current employment and income, as well as her
full time attendance in school, are likewise undisputed.

What is

in dispute is the propriety of the court's conclusion under the
circumstances that Mrs. Coelho has the current ability to meet her
needs.

The court seemed to recognize her dilemma when it concluded

that Mrs. Coelho did not have the ability to pay the mortgage
payment on the residence pending its sale and ordering Mr. Coelho
to do so.

By its very ruling in this regard, the court implicitly

found that Mrs. Coelho has a financial need which she cannot
satisfy and that Mr. Coelho has the ability to satisfy this need.
This inherent inconsistency is an abuse of discretion.

9

Finally, the court must consider the ability of the defendant,
Mr. Coelho, to pay alimony.

The Court made only one finding with

regard to Mr. Coelho's income, specifically:
2.
Based upon the evidence adduced at the
trial on May 10, 1994, the Court finds that
defendant has present earnings as reflected by
his income tax return of $28,000 a year. He,
in fact, has been drawing $4,0 00 a month but
that draw is in part against other partner's
money.
Based upon all of the circumstances
the Court finds that defendant's present
earnings are $3,000 a month or $36,000 a year.
This

findings

was

based

upon

the

adjusted

gross

income

reflected on Mr. Coelho's 1993 tax return (Exhibit D-14) and upon
his testimony.

(R. 703-4)

First of all, the court erred in finding that Mr. Coelho's
present

earnings were only $28,000, thereby giving him

"paper

losses," such as entertainment expense and the use of a portion of
his residence for company purposes, to reduce his taxable income.
The tax return also shows that his actual income from the operation
of his business was $48,226.

Further, there was no evidence,

except Mr. Coelho's self-serving testimony to verify that he had
two partners in his business and that he would be required to pay
back the monies he had received.

Instead, the court seemed to

split the difference between the adjusted gross monthly income of
approximately $2,000 and the gross monthly income of $4,000 to
arrive at an arbitrary figure of $3,000 per month.
The error is even more apparent in light of the expenses
claimed by Mr. Coelho.

His testimony established he had expenses

10

for rent and the mortgage payment which totalled $2,450 per month,
plus $500-600 in credit card expenses, and his own utilities and
other expenses.

Essentially, Mr. Coelho's own figures established

that he had paid out in personal expenses more money that he had
claimed to earn or been able to borrow.

The court ignored these

facts.
Based upon all of the foregoing, it is clear the lower court
abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Coelho's motion to continue
alimony.

The parties were married for sixteen years.

When a

marriage is of long duration and the earning capacity of one spouse
greatly exceeds that of the other, an alimony award is made to
insure that the supported spouse may maintain a standard of living
that would have been enjoyed had the marriage continued.

(See

Naranio, at 1147; See also Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1131, 1134
(Utah App. 1988). Neither Mr. nor Mrs. Coelho could continue to
enjoy the standard

of living the parties had while they were

married; however, even Mrs. Coelho's substantially

compromised

standard of living necessitated an award of alimony to sustain it.
The parties' historical and present abilities to earn income
are significantly and substantially disparate.

The evidence of

Mrs. Coelho's minimum needs and the reasonableness of the needs was
undisputed.

It is clear that she cannot meet these needs without

substantial

financial

support

from

Mr.

Coelho.

The

court

recognized this in ordering Mr. Coelho to pay the monthly house
payment.

Finally, it was clear from the evidence that Mr. Coelho

11

has an ability to continue to pay alimony to Mrs. Coelho.

In

essence, Mrs. Coelho has been punished for her voluntary decision
not to continue to sell real estate, while at the same time Mr.
Coelho has been rewarded for being voluntarily underemployed.
This court should reverse the lower court's denial of Mrs.
Coelho's motion, and enter its own order awarding Mrs. Coelho
alimony, retroactive to January 1, 1994, in the amount of $1,000
per month, which should continue until she remarries, cohabits,
dies, or until further order of the Court.
case

should

be

remanded

for

In the alternative, the

appropriate

findings

and

a

determination of alimony.
POINT II
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ORDERING THAT MR.
COELHO BE REIMBURSED FROM MRS. COELHO'S SHARE OF THE
EQUITY IN THE MARITAL RESIDENCE FOR MORTGAGE PAYMENTS
MADE BY HIM UNTIL IT IS SOLD
The

trial

court

correctly

found

that

Mrs.

Coelho

had

insufficient financial means to meet her monthly mortgage payment
and correctly ordered Mr. Coelho to pay it.

However, instead of

properly characterizing the assistance as alimony, the court, in
essence, characterized it as a loan.

Specifically, Mr. Coelho is

entitled to reimbursement of all amounts paid on the home from Mrs.
Coelho's share of the equity from its sale.
First, implicit in such a ruling is the finding that Mr.
Coelho had the ability to pay alimony and that Mrs. Coelho is
certainly in need of alimony.
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Second, the ruling essentially forces Mrs. Coelho, who is
without sufficient funds to meet her monthly expenses, to deplete
the only major marital asset awarded to her in the Decree of
Divorce in order to meet her monthly living expenses.

This ruling

results in a modification of the property division set forth in the
Decree of Divorce.
twice:

As a result, Mrs. Coelho has been damaged

First, her alimony was inappropriately terminated, and

second, her share of the home equity is being depleted to meet her
monthly

expenses.

Conversely,

Mr.

Coelho

has

no

alimony

obligation, and his share of this asset continues to increase in
value.

Such a result is inequitable and clearly an abuse of

discretion.
This court should reverse the lower court's denial of Mrs.
Coelho's

motion,

retroactively

to

enter
January

its
1,

own

order

1994,

and

awarding

her

continuing

alimony

until

she

remarries, cohabits or dies, or until further order of the court.
The mortgage payments made by Mr. Coelho pending entry of this
court's order should be deemed as payments of alimony to which Mr.
Coelho is not entitled to reimbursement.

In the alternative, the

case should be remanded with instructions to the lower court to
make sufficient findings and enter an award of appropriate alimony.
CONCLUSION
The lower court abused its discretion in denying Mrs. Coelho's
Motion to Continue Alimony in light of the court's recognition that
she had insufficient financial means to meet her monthly expenses.
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Further, the lower court abused its discretion in ordering that Mr.
Coelho be reimbursed from Mrs. Coelho's portion of the equity in
the home for amounts paid by him on the mortgage.
a

depletion

windfall

of Mrs. Coelho's

for Mr. Coelho.

assets to meet

This results in
her needs

and a

This court should reverse the lower

court's order and enter its own, awarding Mrs. Coelho $1,0 00 per
month

in

alimony

cohabits,

dies,

characterizing
January

1,

from
or

January

until

1,

1994, until

further

order

of

she
the

remarries,
court

the mortgage payments made by Mr. Coelho

1994

as

alimony

for which

he

is not

and
since

entitled

to

reimbursement.

In the alternative, this case should be remanded

for

findings

sufficient

and

an order awarding Mrs. Coelho

appropriate amount of alimony.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

'

day of December, 1995.

GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN

HELEN E. CHRISTIAN
Attorneys for
Plaintiff/Appellant.
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